Posted on: May 29, 2026; Updated on: May 29, 2026 By Rhodri Williams
Since the Second World War, the transatlantic alliance has been shaped and sustained
by public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. The U.S. and Europe have remained
deeply interconnected by their economies as well as by NATO, but recent opinion polls
– especially during the second Trump presidency – have shown a growing divergence
in public perceptions. While Europeans have an increasingly negative view of the
U.S., Americans remain generally favourable to Europe and the transatlantic alliance.
From the late 1940s, when the Cold War intensified, the relationship between the U.S.
and Europe has rested on a firm foundation of public legitimacy. The formation of
NATO in 1949 institutionalised a security partnership which Europeans saw as an essential
bulwark against a hostile Soviet Union. For the U.S., the relationship with Europe
was central to the strategy of containment, but also a source of economic advantage.
This underlying consensus on the mutual benefits of the transatlantic alliance survived
periodic and sometimes sharp disagreement over policy. The Vietnam War in the 1960s,
the deployment of Cruise missiles in Europe in the 1980s - and notably the Iraq War
of 2003 – all generated opposition to US policy across Europe, as well as some questioning
of US leadership. However, these episodes did not fundamentally change the view of
the US as Europe’s main strategic partner.
European attitudes towards the U.S. reverted to a more positive norm as the Iraq War
controversy receded, but they began to shift again with the presidency of Donald Trump.
During his first term, Trump made clear his antipathy to NATO and - with reason -
criticised European defense spending. During his second term he has gone further,
withdrawing US support for Ukraine, refusing to challenge Russian aggression, and
threatening to take Greenland from NATO partner Denmark by force. The transatlantic
atmosphere was further soured by the President’s dismissive comments on the contribution
of NATO partners to the conflict in Afghanistan, and by strident attacks on the European
Union and European values by senior administration figures, particularly J.D. Vance,
whose speech to the Munich Security Conference in February 2025 made explicit an ideological
hostility to the EU.
Rhodri Williams at the AIG.
A YouGov survey of voters in Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and Spain in January
2026 revealed that opinion towards the U.S. was the most negative it had been since
2016. The Greenland crisis sent U.S. favourability scores tumbling, with a growing
number of European voters now describing the U.S. as neither a friendly nation nor
an ally. Unsurprisingly, the picture was starkest in staunchly pro-NATO Denmark,
where only 11% of Danes described the U.S. as friendly or an ally, down from 80% in
2023. The percentages were not much better elsewhere – 25% in Spain, 21% in Germany,
30% in the UK and 28% in France.
This negative European sentiment towards the U.S. has only deepened since February,
when the U.S. went to war with Iran. Unilateral action by Washington, with devastating
economic consequences for Europe, confirmed for many the unpredictability and unreliability
of the U.S.
By contrast – and this is something most Europeans don’t realize or appreciate - U.S.
public attitudes towards Europe have remained relatively positive and stable throughout
the Trump era. A survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations in 2025 found
that 40% of Americans considered the EU an ally. In Gallup’s “country ratings” surveys
of U.S. voters, favourability scores for the UK, France and Germany remained well
above 60%. A plurality of Americans also continue to view the security of the U.S.
as being linked to European security. A poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs,
also in 2025, showed 73% of Americans were in favor of maintaining or increasing support
for NATO, and this is matched by strong support for continued U.S. assistance to Ukraine.
So we have an asymmetry. Despite the efforts of European leaders to keep the U.S.
engaged in European security and to maintain a collaborative relationship with the
White House, European public opinion is deeply sceptical about the transatlantic relationship
and the credibility of U.S. security guarantees via NATO. In the U.S., on the other
hand, the Administration’s criticism of and antipathy towards the European Union has
not significantly shifted public opinion. The U.S. public broadly continues to value
the transatlantic partnership and NATO.
What makes this paradoxical situation different from earlier periods of transatlantic
tension is the depth of scepticism on the European side about the reliability of the
US and the credibility of NATO. Past disputes centred on U.S. policy, leaving intact
the underlying assumption that the U.S. was and would remain Europe’s indispensable
security partner. Today that assumption no longer holds. The asymmetry between the
two publics means, however, that the political underpinnings of the transatlantic
partnership are only crumbling on one side.
This matters because the alliance rests ultimately on the consent of democratic electorates.
If European voters continue to doubt U.S. reliability and the “cultural” estrangement
persists, European governments will increasingly “hedge” against the U.S. – investing
in the “strategic autonomy” of the EU as advocated by President Macron, building alternative
security partnerships, and reducing their political dependence on Washington. The
irony is that this might happen despite a majority of Americans remaining supportive
of NATO and transatlantic cooperation.
In September 2001, Europe and NATO immediately rallied to support the U.S. after 9/11.
Were the U.S. to find itself in a future confrontation with China, it may find to
its cost that Europe is less willing to answer the call.
Note: The views expressed are the author’s own, subject to change based on new information,
and do not represent any current or former affiliation.
About the Author
Dr. Rhodri Williams is a former British diplomat and Senior Advisor to Wallbrook,
part of Anthesis, a leading provider of advisory and due diligence services to investors,
companies and NGOs. He has recently served as a Sonoco Visting Fellow with the International
Business program at the Moore School.
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