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Darla Moore School of Business

When they don’t love you back…

Since the Second World War, the transatlantic alliance has been shaped and sustained by public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. The U.S. and Europe have remained deeply interconnected by their economies as well as by NATO, but recent opinion polls – especially during the second Trump presidency – have shown a growing divergence in public perceptions.  While Europeans have an increasingly negative view of the U.S., Americans remain generally favourable to Europe and the transatlantic alliance. 

From the late 1940s, when the Cold War intensified, the relationship between the U.S. and Europe has rested on a firm foundation of public legitimacy.  The formation of NATO in 1949 institutionalised a security partnership which Europeans saw as an essential bulwark against a hostile Soviet Union.  For the U.S., the relationship with Europe was central to the strategy of containment, but also a source of economic advantage.

This underlying consensus on the mutual benefits of the transatlantic alliance survived periodic and sometimes sharp disagreement over policy.  The Vietnam War in the 1960s, the deployment of Cruise missiles in Europe in the 1980s - and notably the Iraq War of 2003 – all generated opposition to US policy across Europe, as well as some questioning of US leadership. However, these episodes did not fundamentally change the view of the US as Europe’s main strategic partner.

European attitudes towards the U.S. reverted to a more positive norm as the Iraq War controversy receded, but they began to shift again with the presidency of Donald Trump.  During his first term, Trump made clear his antipathy to NATO and - with reason - criticised European defense spending. During his second term he has gone further, withdrawing US support for Ukraine, refusing to challenge Russian aggression, and threatening to take Greenland from NATO partner Denmark by force.  The transatlantic atmosphere was further soured by the President’s dismissive comments on the contribution of NATO partners to the conflict in Afghanistan, and by strident attacks on the European Union and European values by senior administration figures, particularly J.D. Vance, whose speech to the Munich Security Conference in February 2025 made explicit an ideological hostility to the EU.

Rhodri Williams at the AIG.
Rhodri Williams at the AIG.

A YouGov survey of voters in Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and Spain in January 2026 revealed that opinion towards the U.S. was the most negative it had been since 2016.   The Greenland crisis sent U.S. favourability scores tumbling, with a growing number of European voters now describing the U.S. as neither a friendly nation nor an ally.  Unsurprisingly, the picture was starkest in staunchly pro-NATO Denmark, where only 11% of Danes described the U.S. as friendly or an ally, down from 80% in 2023.  The percentages were not much better elsewhere – 25% in Spain, 21% in Germany, 30% in the UK and 28% in France.

This negative European sentiment towards the U.S. has only deepened since February, when the U.S. went to war with Iran.  Unilateral action by Washington, with devastating economic consequences for Europe, confirmed for many the unpredictability and unreliability of the U.S. 

By contrast – and this is something most Europeans don’t realize or appreciate - U.S. public attitudes towards Europe have remained relatively positive and stable throughout the Trump era.  A survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations in 2025 found that 40% of Americans considered the EU an ally.  In Gallup’s “country ratings” surveys of U.S. voters, favourability scores for the UK, France and Germany remained well above 60%. A plurality of Americans also continue to view the security of the U.S. as being linked to European security. A poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, also in 2025, showed 73% of Americans were in favor of maintaining or increasing support for NATO, and this is matched by strong support for continued U.S. assistance to Ukraine.                                                                                       

So we have an asymmetry.  Despite the efforts of European leaders to keep the U.S. engaged in European security and to maintain a collaborative relationship with the White House, European public opinion is deeply sceptical about the transatlantic relationship and the credibility of U.S. security guarantees via NATO.  In the U.S., on the other hand, the Administration’s criticism of and antipathy towards the European Union has not significantly shifted public opinion. The U.S. public broadly continues to value the transatlantic partnership and NATO. 

What makes this paradoxical situation different from earlier periods of transatlantic tension is the depth of scepticism on the European side about the reliability of the US and the credibility of NATO.   Past disputes centred on U.S. policy, leaving intact the underlying assumption that the U.S. was and would remain Europe’s indispensable security partner.  Today that assumption no longer holds.  The asymmetry between the two publics means, however, that the political underpinnings of the transatlantic partnership are only crumbling on one side.

This matters because the alliance rests ultimately on the consent of democratic electorates. If European voters continue to doubt U.S. reliability and the “cultural” estrangement persists, European governments will increasingly “hedge” against the U.S. – investing in the “strategic autonomy” of the EU as advocated by President Macron, building alternative security partnerships, and reducing their political dependence on Washington.  The irony is that this might happen despite a majority of Americans remaining supportive of NATO and transatlantic cooperation.

In September 2001, Europe and NATO immediately rallied to support the U.S. after 9/11.  Were the U.S. to find itself in a future confrontation with China, it may find to its cost that Europe is less willing to answer the call.

Note: The views expressed are the author’s own, subject to change based on new information, and do not represent any current or former affiliation.


rhodri williams headshot
About the Author

Dr. Rhodri Williams is a former British diplomat and Senior Advisor to Wallbrook, part of Anthesis, a leading provider of advisory and due diligence services to investors, companies and NGOs.  He has recently served as a Sonoco Visting Fellow with the International Business program at the Moore School. 


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